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ABSTRACT 
This Article discusses two important facets of Military Regulation and veterans law. 
First, this Article explores how the Uniform Code of Military Justice treats veterans 
accused of committing self-injury. Thus, there is a prohibition on, including criminal 
prosecution of, attempted suicide, which this Article argues exacerbates the issues 
which many of our brave servicemen and women face upon returning home from 
combat, often carrying the burden of mental disorders such as post-traumatic stress 
disorder. Second, this Article delves into Air Force Regulations, which prohibits 
termination, without cause, once an officer reaches the rank of Major and has served 
at least fourteen years. Despite this codified prohibition, the Air Force has been 
terminating these individuals, without cause, and denying them their accrued 
retirement benefits. This Article argues that this practice is at best prohibited by 
Military Regulation and at worst unconstitutional. 
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I. INTRODUCTION1 
t is not surprising that military troops returning from Iraq and 
Afghanistan encounter reintegration challenges, which can range 
from suffering with symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), discovering that they have been the victim of identity theft, or 
facing illegal home foreclosures. 
Unfortunately, many of these problems are unavoidable and are the 
predictable result of lengthy deployments abroad. However, what is 
avoidable is the Military’s response. The Military, itself, is the 
architect of many significant problems that service members face 
because of its unusual interpretations of Military Regulations. The 
Military interprets its regulations to prejudice service members. 
This Article discusses and analyzes two policy areas in which the 
Military has embraced statutory or regulatory interpretations that harm 
and prejudice its members. The first policy area, analyzed below in 
Part II, governs the Uniform Code of Military Justice’s criminal 
prohibitions on “wrongful” self-injury. The Article explains and 
discusses instances in which the Military has prosecuted sick and 
suicidal soldiers, who are often suffering with post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD), for the crime of attempting suicide.2 
The second policy area, discussed below in Part III, governs the 
Air Force’s treatment of service members who are within six years of 
retirement and who are protected by Federal Law and Military 
Regulations from termination without cause once they reach the rank 
of Major and have served at least fourteen years. The Air Force, 
contrary to its own Regulations and to the Department of Defense 
Instructions, has terminated Airmen with fourteen years in service and 
denied them retirement benefits. These terminations not only prejudice 
service members, but may also violate the U.S. Constitutional 
                                                            
1 The AMVETS Legal Clinic, at Chapman University, provides pro bono 
representation to service members and their families. The discussion and 
analysis in this Article originate from actual cases, which are now being litigated 
by Post Doctoral Fellows, and Faculty, in the AMVETS Legal Clinic. For more 
information about the AMVETS Legal Clinic, see Law Scribbler: Chapman 
University Legal Clinic Does Double Duty, A.B.A. J., 21 (Feb. 2013). 
2 This section of the Article [Part II] is adapted and excerpted from Ari Freilich, 
Fallen Soldier: Military (In)justice and the Criminalization of Attempted Suicide 
After U.S. v. Caldwell, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 74 (2014). 
I 
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provisions protecting property rights and guaranteeing procedural due 
process.3 
II. THE MILITARY’S POLICY OF CRIMINALIZING ATTEMPTED 
SUICIDE EXACERBATES THE MILITARY’S SUICIDE EPIDEMIC4 
A U.S. Army soldier was more likely to die by suicide last year 
than from combat, accidents, or illness. Military suicide rates climbed 
to an all-time high as the Pentagon scrambled for answers to stem the 
tide. But amid this deadly “suicide epidemic,” the Military has clung 
to an outdated, cruel, and damaging policy of criminalizing suicide 
attempts and self-injury. This means that the 3500 service members 
who survived attempted suicide last year may still face years of jail 
time for succumbing to mental injury and disease. 
The Military’s numbers tell a tragic story. In July 2012, Defense 
Secretary Leon Panetta declared in testimony to Congress that a 
“suicide epidemic” was afflicting the Armed Forces.5 “‘Something,’ he 
said, ‘is wrong.’”6 A record 350 active duty service members took 
their own lives that year, more than double the number from ten years 
before.7 Army suicide rates doubled even faster, in a span of just five 
years, to become the leading cause of death among Army forces.8 
Across all the services, hundreds more died of suicide this decade than 
in twelve bloody years of war in Afghanistan.9 
                                                            
3 This topic is explored and discussed more fully in Josh Flynn-Brown, Analyzing 
the Tension between Military Force Reductions and the Constitution: Protecting 
an Officer’s Property Interest in Continued Employment, 46 SUFFOLK L. REV. 
1067 (2013). 
4 This section of the Article is adapted and excerpted from Freilich, supra note 2. 
5 See Kathleen Miller, Military Faces Suicide ‘Epidemic,’ Panetta Tells Congress, 
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jul. 25, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-
25/Military-faces-suicide-epidemic-panetta-tells-u-s-lawmakers.html. 
6 Id. 
7 See James Dao & Andrew W. Lehren, Baffling Rise in Suicides Plagues the U.S. 
Military, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/16
/us/baffling-rise-in-suicides-plagues-us-military.html. 
8 Anna Mulrine, Suicide ‘Epidemic’ in Army: July was Worst Month, Pentagon 
Says, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.csmonitor
.com/USA/Military/2012/0817/Suicide-epidemic-in-Army-July-was-worst-
month-Pentagon-says. 
9 See IRAQ COALITION CASUALTY COUNT, Afghanistan Coalition Military 
Fatalities by Year, http://icasualties.org/ (last visited May 8, 2014). 
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The Military’s attempted suicide rate is even higher. The 
Department of Defense Suicide Prevention Office estimates that for 
every active duty suicide, 10 more active duty service members 
attempt to take their lives each year; at least half of those have to be 
hospitalized for their self-injuries.10 A Defense Department survey of 
nearly 30,000 active duty service members from every branch revealed 
that a staggering 2% of Army, 2.3% of Marines, and 3% of Navy 
respondents had attempted suicide at some point in their careers.11 In 
addition, the Pentagon estimated that 950 veterans under VA care 
attempted suicide each month between October 2008 and December 
2010.12 
This tide of suicides has baffled the Military 13  because, 
historically, the Military’s suicide rate was significantly lower than the 
civilian rate.14 Military suicide rates began trending upward in 2004 
and crested above the national average in 2008.15 Along with rising 
suicide rates, diagnosed cases of PTSD have increased steadily in the 
Military since 2003.16 More than one in five veterans of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars have now been diagnosed with PTSD, more than 
300,000 men and women in total.17 Their mental injury from war, 
PTSD, is “strongly linked to suicidal behavior and it is a major 
predictor of who transitions from suicidal ideation to attempting 
suicide.”18 Military physicians have also documented a rising trend in 
                                                            
10 DEFENSE SUICIDE PREVENTION OFFICE, Section on Facts About Suicide, 
http://www.suicideoutreach.org/about_suicide.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2014) 
[hereinafter DEFENSE SUICIDE PREVENTION OFFICE]. 
11 Id. 
12 Mulrine, supra note 8. 
13 See Dao & Lehren, supra note 7. 
14 DEFENSE SUICIDE PREVENTION OFFICE, supra note 10. 
15 Id. 
16 See FACE THE FACTS USA, Shocking PTSD, Suicide Rates for Vets (Jun. 6, 
2013), http://www.facethefactsusa.org/facts/the-true-price-of-war-in-human-ter
ms/. 
17 Charles W. Hoge et al., Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health 
Problems, and Barriers to Care, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 13 (2004). 
18 E.A. Selby et al, Overcoming the Fear of Lethal Injury: Evaluating Suicidal 
Behavior in the Military through the Lens of the Interpersonal—Psychological 
Theory of Suicide, 30 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 298, 301 (2010); William 
Hudenko & Tina Crenshaw, The Relationship Between PTSD and Suicide, 
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS NATIONAL CENTER FOR PTSD, 
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non-suicidal self-injuries, like habitual self-cutting, attributed to “long, 
repeated combat tours” and “strong feelings of desperation.”19 
However, while the Military has acknowledged this growing 
suicide epidemic and taken steps to ameliorate the problem, it has left 
in place cruel and archaic regulations that punish service members 
who survive attempted suicide. It has continued to involuntarily 
separate or prosecute its sick and injured under criminal codes—
Articles 115 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ)—that penalize attempted suicide and self-injury. Article 115 
criminalizes “malingering,” which includes “intentional infliction of 
self-injury for the purpose of avoiding work, duty, or service.” 20 
Article 134, called “the general article,” is an extraordinarily broad and 
unusual catch-all, criminalizing “all disorders and neglects to the 
prejudice of good order and discipline in the Armed Forces” and “all 
conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the Armed Forces.”21 The 
Manual for Courts-Martial lists “self-injury without intent to avoid 
service” as a paradigmatic example of conduct punishable under this 
code. 22  Military courts have continued to interpret those criminal 
statutes very broadly up to the present day. 
A. Civilian Courts’ Modern Consensus 
The legal history of suicide demonstrates that military justice has 
fallen woefully out of step with developments in civilian courts in this 
area. Most American civilian jurisdictions decriminalized attempted 
suicide by the end of the horse and buggy era.23 Over fifty years ago, 
the Model Penal Code’s drafters wrote, “We think it clear that 
[attempted suicide] is not an area in which the penal law can be 
effective and that its intrusion on such tragedies is an abuse.”24 The 
                                                                                                                                            
http://archive.is/UbO2 (last visited May 8, 2014) (citing studies that find a 
“robust relationship” between PTSD and suicide). 
19 PATRICIA A. ADLER, THE TENDER CUT: INSIDE THE HIDDEN WORLD OF SELF-
INJURY 37 (2011). 
20 10 U.S.C. § 915 (2012). 
21 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2012). 
22 See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES IV-60 (2008), available at 
http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/mcm2008.pdf. 
23 See Thomas J. Marzen et al., “Suicide: A Constitutional Right?”—Reflections 
Eleven Years Later, 35 DUQ. L. REV. 261, 264 (1996). 
24 MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.5 cmt. at 1 (Tentative Draft No. 9, 1959). 
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drafters also rejected the criminalization of non-suicidal self-injury.25 
Subsequent Model Penal Code drafters went even further declaring 
that: 
[C]riminal punishment is singularly inefficacious to deter attempts 
to commit suicide . . . . It seems preposterous to argue that the 
visitation of criminal sanctions upon one who fails in the effort is 
likely to inhibit persons from undertaking a serious attempt to take 
their own lives . . . . There is a certain moral extravagance in imposing 
criminal punishment on a person who has sought his own self-
destruction, who has not attempted direct injury to anyone else, and 
who more properly requires medical or psychiatric attention.26 
No American jurisdiction has criminally punished a suicide 
attempt since 1961,27 and today no state has any law criminalizing 
attempted suicide. 28  As the California Supreme Court wrote thirty 
years ago, “[A]ll modern research points to one conclusion about the 
problem of suicide—the irrelevance of the criminal law to its 
solution.” 29  This, the Federal Ninth Circuit said, is “the modern 
consensus” in this area.30 
B. Military Courts’ Anachronistic Approach 
However, the modern Military has not adopted that consensus and 
has continued to criminalize self-injury. After the adoption of the 
UCMJ in 1951, military courts were initially hostile to the notion of 
punishing the suicidal, even though military law had long punished 
self-injury as a violation of the “general article.”31 In the 1955 case of 
                                                            
25 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1985) (defining “assault” to include both 
assault and battery, where one “attempts to cause or purposefully, knowingly, or 
recklessly causes bodily injury to another”) (emphasis added). 
26 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.5 cmt. at 2 (Official Draft & Revised Commentaries 
1980). 
27 Id.; Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 859 n.14 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(“Research indicates that the last prosecution in the U.S. for attempted suicide 
probably occurred in 1961. The North Carolina Supreme Court relied on the 
English common law to determine that attempted suicide was punishable as a 
misdemeanor.”) (citing State v. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854 (N.C. 1961)). 
28 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 810. 
29 In re Joseph G., 34 Cal. 3d 429, 434 (1983) (quoting David S. Markson, The 
Punishment of Suicide, 14 VILL. L. REV. 463, 473 (1969)). 
30 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 847. 
31 Capt. Richard L. Dunn, USAF, Aspects of Malingering, 17 A.F. L. REV. 1, 2 
(1975). 
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United States v. Jacobs, for example, the Army Board of Review held 
that “intentional self-injury,” without more, was not a cognizable 
offense under military law. 32  The Board required an additional 
showing that a service member’s self-injury actually impaired his 
ability to perform military duties in order to justify criminal 
punishment.33 
The Air Force Court of Military Review followed that same 
approach one week later in United States v. Walker and explicitly 
invalidated prosecutions for attempted suicide where there was no 
proof of fraudulent intent. 34  In that case, the accused had been 
convicted of “wrongfully and willfully attempting to commit suicide” 
under Article 134 after he consumed 100 sleeping pills.35 Like the 
Army board in Jacobs, the Walker court concluded that “attempted 
suicide” was not, without more, a cognizable offense under military 
law.36 The court attempted to limit commands’ unfettered discretion to 
prosecute crimes under Article 134, holding that courts “cannot grant 
to the services unlimited authority to eliminate vital elements from . . . 
offenses expressly defined by Congress and permit the remaining 
elements to be punished as an offense under [the general article].”37 
After the Walker case, no further prosecutions of attempted suicide 
cases were reported for over a decade.38 
However, this measured approach did not hold. In the 1968 case of 
United States v. Taylor, the Military’s highest court signaled a serious 
shift when it approved the Article 134 conviction of a Seaman Recruit 
who superficially slashed his arms with a razor blade in order to 
“outdo the performance” of another serviceman who had engaged in 
the same conduct.39 Though the Government never alleged that Taylor 
had intended to evade military duty through this act —or that he had 
genuinely attempted suicide— the U.S. Court of Military Appeals 
declared that the accused’s mental state and purpose were essentially 
irrelevant in Article 134 prosecutions. The court held that Article 134 
                                                            
32 United States v. Jacobs, 20 C.M.R. 458, 460 (A.B.R. 1955). 
33 Dunn, supra note 31, at 5. 
34 Id. at 343. 
35 United States v. Walker, 20 C.M.R. 931, 933 (A.B.R.. 1955). 
36 Id. at 934. 
37 Id. at 935. 
38 Dunn, supra note 31, at 5. 
39 U.S. v. Taylor, 38 C.M.R. 393, 395 (C.M.A. 1968). 
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had “an objective orientation . . . calculated to preserve good order and 
discipline, without necessarily considering [the accused’s] particular 
mental attitude.”40 Therefore, so long as the accused’s self-injury had a 
direct prejudicial effect upon the good order and discipline of the 
Armed Forces, he could be prosecuted for self-injury whether his 
purpose was wrongful or not.41 Where government prosecutors lacked 
sufficient evidence to charge the suicidal under Article 115 as duty-
shirking malingerers, now they could cite the external effects of a 
failed suicide attempt to prosecute and punish the mentally ill and 
injured. 
The Court of Military Appeals faced just that situation in United 
States v. Ramsey, where the court, citing Taylor, upheld the Article 
134 conviction of an Army Specialist who shot himself in the shoulder 
while serving in Operation Desert Storm.42 Ramsey was arguably not 
genuinely suicidal. He had shot himself with a single round in a 
nonlethal area just after arriving in a combat zone, and his explanation 
for that conduct shifted multiple times.43 However, the Ramsey court 
conducted no inquiry into Ramsey’s intent and sanctioned criminal 
punishment under Article 134 on the premise that he was in fact 
genuinely suicidal. 44  Because Ramsey admitted that his suicide 
attempt “killed the morale of his unit” and made his colleagues “work 
a little harder to try to fill the position that he was supposed to be 
filling,” the court ruled that he could be punished criminally for 
prejudicing good order and discipline.45 The Ramsey court established 
a notably low bar for criminal prosecution. Commanders could allege 
that almost any suicide attempt affected the morale of those who knew 
and nearly lost a friend and colleague; moreover, treatment and 
hospitalization for survivors would leave duty stations temporarily 
unfilled. News that a service member had come down with measles or 
survived a car wreck might have the same prejudicial effect. In sum, 
these cases indicated that under Article 134, attempted suicide was 
increasingly looking like a strict liability offense. 
                                                            
40 Id. at 395. 
41 Id. 
42 U.S. v. Ramsey, 40 M.J. 71, 75 (C.M.A. 1994). 
43 Id. at 72. 
44 Id. at 75. 
45 Id. at 74. 
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In United States v. Johnson, the U.S. Court of Military Appeals 
vastly broadened the scope of self-injuries punishable under Article 
115, as well. The Johnson court approved the Article 115 prosecution 
of an Army Staff Sergeant who, to avoid facing a possible court-
martial trial on other charges, attempted to hang himself while 
injecting a near-fatal dose of heroin.46 The court accepted Johnson’s 
suicide attempt as genuine but held that he could be prosecuted for 
fraudulently attempting to avoid work, duty, or service because he 
admitted that he attempted suicide in order to avoid the shame and 
embarrassment of a possible trial.47 The court stated that Johnson’s 
work, duty, and service included his “availability for prosecution” by 
military authorities. 48  Thus, his desire to escape that general 
“availability” amounted to criminally punishable duty-shirking. 
“Usually attempts to commit suicide are not thought of in connection 
with malingering,” the court acknowledged. Commenting further, the 
court stated: 
Probably this is because malingering has often been a tactic 
employed to extend, rather than shorten, life expectancy—and 
especially so in a combat situation. However, we perceive nothing in 
the definition of malingering which precludes prosecution for 
attempted suicide if the ‘purpose’ of the attempt is avoidance of ‘duty 
or service.’49 
The court cited approvingly even broader language from its earlier 
opinion in United States v. Mamaluy, stating that Article 115 
“unquestionably . . . intended to proscribe a self-inflicted injury which 
would prevent the injured party from being available for the 
performance of all military tasks.”50 The Mamaluy court had found 
that a suicidal service member’s hospitalization, itself, was proof of 
the service member’s purpose to shirk military duty: “If by injuring 
himself he forces the Government to confine him in a hospital, he has 
breached his obligation to the service and successfully escaped the 
performance of many [m]ilitary duties assigned.”51 
                                                            
46 United States. v. Johnson, 26 M.J. 415, 417 (C.M.A. 1988). 
47 Id. 
48 Id at 417. 
49 Id. 
50 United States v. Mamaluy, 27 C.M.R. 176, 178 (1959) (emphasis added). 
51 Id. 
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C. The Military’s Highest Court Punts in U.S. v. Caldwell 
In July 2012, the same month the Defense Department declared 
that a “suicide epidemic” afflicted the Armed Forces,52 the Military’s 
highest court granted review of the following question in United States 
v. Caldwell: whether a bona fide suicide attempt remained criminally 
punishable under military law. 53  Two years earlier, Marine Corps 
Private Lazzaric Caldwell was convicted at special court-martial 
pursuant to his guilty plea on a charge of “wrongful self-injury” under 
Article 134, for slitting his wrists in “a genuine suicide attempt.”54 The 
trial judge acknowledged that the self-injury offense was an “odd 
charge because . . . it is basically criminalizing an attempted 
suicide,” 55  but he approved a court-martial sentence that included 
confinement for six months and a punitive misconduct discharge,56 
despite evidence that the Marine suffered diagnosed depression and 
PTSD.57 
Though the Caldwell court’s April 2013 opinion narrowly rejected 
a strict liability interpretation of Article 134’s self-injury prohibition 
and vacated Private Caldwell’s conviction, the court dodged the 
central question before it and declined to invalidate criminal 
prosecution of the suicidal.58 Alarmingly, the minority’s view that a 
depressed and suicidal veteran may be imprisoned for causing medical 
personnel to expend resources to save him lost by just a single vote.59 
D. The Tragic Effects of the Military’s Criminal Suicide Policy 
In most respects, the modern Military has recently begun to 
approach suicide with informed compassion, recognizing that 
treatment is the best deterrent. It has initiated more than 900 suicide 
prevention programs and anti-stigma campaigns to promote mental 
                                                            
52 See Miller, supra note 5. 
53 United States v. Caldwell, 72 M.J. 137, 138 (C.A.A.F 2013). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 139 (citation omitted). 
56 Id. 
57 See id. at 145 & n.3 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. at 138 (majority opinion). 
59 Id. at 142 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (stating that the court overstepped its bounds by 
not enforcing strict liability). 
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health care, 60  especially for the 300,000 veterans of Iraq and 
Afghanistan who have already been diagnosed with PTSD. 61  The 
Army’s Suicide Prevention Strategy in 2012 called for “safe and 
positive messages addressing mental illness and suicide . . . to help 
reduce prejudice and promote help seeking.”62 
But the Military is marching forward with one foot and backward 
with the other. Criminal prosecutions for attempted suicide and self-
injury made many of the Military’s therapeutic efforts ineffective and 
exacerbated this tragic problem. The Military’s “safe and positive 
messages” addressing suicide obviously fall on deaf ears when they 
are still joined with the unmistakable threat of criminal punishment. 
While a soldier injured by shrapnel blast has no reason to fear 
punishment for his wound of war, his PTSD-stricken comrade-in-arms 
is likely confessing to a crime when he tells his psychiatrist about his 
suicidal behavior. After he admits to suicidal conduct, his psychiatrist, 
according to Military Regulations, would be compelled to stop the 
session on the spot to warn her patient of his rights against self-
incrimination under Article 31. 63  The psychiatrist’s subsequent 
questions about her patient’s suicidal ideation and intent would be an 
essential part of the diagnostic process and would be crucial to arriving 
at a prescribed course of treatment, therapy, and rehabilitation. 
However, those same questions would be indistinguishable from 
Military Police interrogators’ and might be used against the 
serviceman in a criminal court-martial. 64  Because health record 
privacy protections do not apply to the suicidal, that admission could 
be shared with his command and used against him at trial.65 Without 
                                                            
60 See THE CHALLENGE AND THE PROMISE: STRENGTHENING THE FORCE, 
PREVENTING SUICIDE, AND SAVING LIVES: FINAL REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT 
OF DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON THE PREVENTION OF SUICIDE BY MEMBERS OF THE 
ARMED FORCES 42 (2010), available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA529502. 
61 See Hoge et al., supra note 17, at 13. 
62 Id. 
63 See United States. v. Calandrino, 12 C.M.R. 689, 692–95 (A.F.B.R. 1953) 
(stating that a psychiatrist who suspected his patient of malingering should have 
warned him of his testimonial rights prior to initiating the interview). 
64 See id. at 689 (“Accordingly, the accused became ‘a person suspected of an 
offense’ within the meaning of UCMJ, Art 31, during the first interview and 
compliance with the cited article was required.”). 
65 See 32 C.F.R. § 637.9 (“Medical records will remain under the control of the 
records custodian who will make them available for courts-martial or other legal 
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the hassle of a trial, the Military could also dishonorably discharge 
him, denying him access to the medical and mental health care he 
desperately needs. 
No wonder so many choose to suffer in silence. 
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE AIR FORCE’S AD-HOC REDUCTION 
IN FORCE POLICIES66 
While criminalizing suicide is an unusually bizarre example of the 
Military interpreting its own provisions to the detriment of service 
members, unfortunately it is not an isolated one. This section discusses 
another example in which the Military failed to follow its own explicit 
regulations, which resulted in the unjust and unlawful termination of 
157 Air Force Officers. 
In November 2011, the U.S. Air Force terminated 157 Air Force 
Officers who had been promoted to Major and had served at least 
fourteen years on active duty.67 The Air Force had not selected them 
for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel; however, under Air Force 
Regulations, Department of Defense Policy, and Federal Law, that 
lone fact should not have led to their termination.68 Federal Law and 
Military Regulations allow officers to remain in military service even 
if they were not selected for promotion to the next highest rank, so 
long as they have achieved the rank of Major, have completed at least 
fourteen years of military service, and do not have derogatory 
information in their personnel files.69 Derogatory information includes 
things like conviction of crimes (such as driving under the influence) 
                                                                                                                                            
proceedings. Procedures for obtaining information from medical records are 
contained in AR 40-66.” Recent changes to AR 40-66 occurred in 2008 that 
allow for disclosure of medical records when a soldier is accused of suicidal 
behavior. See U.S. Dep’t of Army, Reg. 40-66 ¶ 2-4 a.(2)(a), Medical Record 
Administration and Healthcare Documentation (2010), available at 
http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r40_66.pdf. 
66 For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Flynn-Brown, supra note 3. 
67 Joshua Flynn-Brown & Kyndra Miller Rotunda, The Air Force Grounds Its 
Officers, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles
/SB10001424052970204224604577030221768840762. 
68 Id.; Mark Thompson, Air Force: Firing for Effect?, TIME (Jan. 2, 2012), 
http://nation.time.com/2012/01/03/air-force-firing-for-effect/. 
69 See Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1068 (citing and discussing H.R. REP. NO. 
96-1462, at 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6333, 6343). 
69 Id. 
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or engaging in misconduct that results in a letter of reprimand or non-
judicial punishment.70 
Regarding the termination of the 157 officers, the Secretary of the 
Air Force instructed the selective continuation board to apply only a 
five year protective window instead of the six year protective window 
provided by law.71 This meant that Majors who had at least fifteen 
years in service were allowed to continue their careers, but those with 
fourteen years in service (contrary to the governing law and 
regulations) could not, regardless of whether the officers had 
derogatory information in their personnel files.72 In fact, many of the 
157 did not have derogatory information in their records and were 
exemplary officers.73 Their careers were cut short when they were very 
near retirement and rightfully within the protective window. 
Consequently, the Air Force unlawfully denied these Officers their 
retirement pensions and medical benefits.74 Why would the Air Force 
do such a thing? Terminating these personnel allows the Air Force to 
avoid its normal retirement obligations. Yes, the Air Force’s 
motivation is the prosaic one of saving money by breaking promises to 
it military pilots. 
The Secretary of the Air Force’s unilateral decision to narrow the 
protective window from six years to five years raises several difficult 
legal questions. A most significant question is whether there is any 
room within existing law that would allow the Secretary to do this. 
Related to that is the question of whether the Secretary of the Air 
Force abused whatever discretion the law allows. Additionally, this 
retroactive change in the interpretation of the regulation raises the 
issue of whether the Air Force Officers have any legal claims 
stemming from their reasonable expectation that they could continue 
in service after serving for at least fourteen years and reaching the rank 
of Major. 
What follows is a brief analysis and discussion of the governing 
law as it applies to this unusual situation. Ultimately, this Article 
                                                            
70 Id. at 1077 & n.66. 
71 The Selective Continuation Board considers promotion and retention of Officers 
whom the Air Force has “passed over” for promotion, i.e., declined to promote. 
See Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1069. 
72 Id. 
73 Flynn-Brown & Rotunda, supra note 67; Thompson, supra note 68. 
74 Flynn-Brown & Rotunda, supra note 67; Thompson, supra note 68. 
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concludes the following: that the applicable federal law and governing 
regulations are clear and thus leave no room for an alternative 
interpretation; that the Secretary acted unilaterally and without 
authority; and that terminating these Officers, contrary to the Air 
Force’s written policy, violated their Constitutional property rights by 
denying them continued employment and violated their Constitutional 
procedural rights by failing to afford them a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard before their employment with the Air Force was terminated. 
A. Governing Statutes and Regulations 
The Military is not required to follow the provisions of the 
Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA), which protects civilian 
retirement benefits and requires employers to provide some percentage 
of vested pension benefits after anywhere from three to seven years of 
employment.75 Military retirement benefits do not vest at seven years, 
as would ordinarily occur in the civilian system. However, so long as 
the officers promote to the rank of Major and serve on active duty for 
at least fourteen years, something similar to vesting occurs. Military 
Regulations provide a safe harbor that allows officers to continue their 
military service until they have completed at least twenty years of 
active duty military service and are eligible for retirement. 76 
Essentially, it protects them from being terminated without benefits on 
the eve of retirement. 
Federal law, specifically The Defense Officers Personnel 
Management Act (DOPMA), 77  broadly governs personnel and 
promotion activities of officers within the Armed Services. 
Annotations from the floor debate at the time it was enacted in 1980 
make clear that Congress intended to soften the rigid “up or out” 
policy of the Military by providing some expectation of continued 
employment after officers attained a certain rank and number of years 
in service. The House of Representatives Report to the Committee on 
Armed Services explains and interprets DOPMA by stating that an 
                                                            
75 For a general discussion, and comparison to military benefits model, see Joshua 
Flynn-Brown & Joel Marrero, For Those Who Protect Us, Fair Retirement 
Regulations Are In Order, L. A. DAILY J., Feb. 22, 2012. 
76 See Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1068 (citing and discussing H.R. REP. NO. 
96-1462, at 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6333, 6343). 
76 Id. at 1074. 
77 Defense Officer Personnel Management Act, Pub. L. No. 96-513, 94 Stat. 2835 
(1980). 
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officer “on attaining permanent O-4 grade, has a career expectation of 
twenty years in service” and after competing twenty years “is eligible 
for immediate retirement.”78 The same report also makes clear that 
budget or financial constraints were not a “principal aim.”79 
The notion of a safe harbor for Officers reaching the rank of Major 
who have served at least fourteen years in service is further reflected in 
Department of Defense Instructions and Military Regulations, which 
explicitly guarantee that Majors who are within six years of retirement 
ordinarily will be continued on active duty, stating, “Commissioned 
officers on the Active Duty List who hold the grade of O-4 [Major], 
who are subject to discharge . . . shall normally be selected for 
continuation . . . if the officer will qualify for retirement within six 
years of the date of such continuation.”80 The only stated exception to 
this rule is when derogatory information exists in an Officer’s 
personnel file.81 
Until recently, every branch of the Military, including the Air 
Force, has interpreted DOPMA and relevant Department of Defense 
Instructions as providing a protective window that begins at the 
fourteenth year in service. 82  In fact, Army regulations specifically 
mandate the continuation of Majors with at least fourteen years in 
service.83 It was not until recently that the Air Force, and specifically 
Air Force Secretary Donnelly, unilaterally changed the protective 
window from six years to five years. That is, had the 157 Air Force 
Officers joined the Army fourteen years ago—or any other branch of 
service except for their Air Force—they would have been allowed to 
remain in Military service and earn a full retirement. It is clear that the 
Air Force acted capriciously in treating these Officers disparately. 
                                                            
78 See Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1068 (citing and discussing H.R. REP. NO. 
96-1462, at 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6333, 6343). 
79 Id. at 1074. 
80 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1462, at 12 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6333, 
6343. 
81 See Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1077 n.66. 
82 Id. at 1081. 
83 Id. at 1072 & n.36 (citing DEP’T OF THE ARMY, DA MEMO 600-2, POLICIES AND 
PROCEDURES FOR ACTIVE-DUTY LIST OFFICER SELECTION BOARDS app. C, § C-
2(a) (2006)). 
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Interestingly, after the case involving the 157 Air Force Officers 
received significant media attention, 84  the Department of Defense 
amended its Instruction, and adjusted the six year window down to a 
four year window.85 However, this does not change the fact that the 
Air Force violated its own Instructions that existed at the time. 86 
Changing the Instruction after the fact does not cure the legal violation 
at the time; it only exacerbates the problem. If the Air Force Secretary 
already enjoyed wide discretion, why change the Instruction at all? 
B. Supreme Court Precedent and the Application of Perry v. 
Sinderman  
The plight of the terminated Airmen is analogous to a case that the 
Supreme Court decided several years ago which supports the 
proposition that what the Air Force has done is unconstitutional—
taking away a property interest without paying just compensation. The 
case, Perry v. Sinderman, involved a college professor whose 
employment contract was not renewed by the college where he 
worked.87 Professor Sinderman served as a professor for ten years. 
During his last four years of employment, he served under a series of 
one year contracts. 88  The college then decided not to renew his 
contract but failed to provide an explanation for its refusal.89  The 
college claimed that it had virtually no duty or obligation to the 
professor.90 
Professor Sinderman disagreed, claiming that the college had 
created something of a de facto tenure system based on peculiar 
wording in its Faculty Handbook which stated, “The Administration of 
the College wishes the faculty member to feel that he has permanent 
                                                            
84 See Flynn-Brown & Rotunda, supra note 67; Thompson, supra note 68; 
Caroline May, Military Advocates Decry Illegal Terminations, THE DAILY 
CALLER (Nov. 25, 2011), http://dailycaller.com/2011/11/25/military-advocates-
decry-illegal-early-terminations-of-157-air-force-majors/#!; Caroline May, US 
Air Force Face Litigation for Illegal Termination of 157 Officers, THE DAILY 
CALLER (Dec. 2, 2011), http://dailycaller.com/2011/12/02/us-air-force-faces-
litigation-for-illegal-termination-of-157-officers/. 
85 Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1079. 
86 Id. 
87 Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 594–95 (1972). 
88 Id. at 594. 
89 Id. at 595. 
90 Id. 
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tenure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory[,] as long as he 
displays a cooperative attitude . . . and as long as he is happy in his 
work.”91 
Professor Sinderman bolstered his argument by relying on 
guidelines enacted by the Coordinating Board of the Texas College 
and University System which guaranteed that teachers employed in the 
state or university system for seven years or more have some form of 
job tenure.92 The Board’s guidelines defined tenure as “assurance to an 
experienced faculty member that he may expect to continue in his 
academic position unless adequate cause for dismissal is 
demonstrated.”93 
The Supreme Court agreed with Professor Sinderman and rejected 
the notion that only a rigid, technical form would bind the college.94 
The Court found that Professor Sinderman did have a property interest 
in continued employment based on “existing rules and understandings” 
that were generally expressed in the Faculty Handbook and in the 
Texas University System’s guidelines regarding tenure.95 The Court 
found that Mr. Sinderman had a property interest in reemployment 
based on the implied contract between Mr. Sinderman and the 
college.96 Even though the college did not have a formal tenure plan, 
the Court agreed that the college may have created such a system in 
practice.97 The Court said that these employment guarantees came in 
the form of explicit guarantees, such as the employer’s handbook, and 
implicit guarantees, such as the words and conduct by college officials 
and administrators, which could have led Professor Sinderman to 
reasonably believe that his job was secure.98 
C. Sinderman Applied to Recent Air Force Terminations 
One may argue that a case arising in an academic context should 
not bind the U.S. Military. However, later cases make clear that the 
                                                            
91 Id. at 600. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 600 n.6. 
94 Id. at 601 (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 
(1972)). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 602. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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holding in Sinderman applies to cases arising in the military context.99 
The Air Force may also have created legally binding obligations of 
continued employment to its Officers through implicit and explicit 
guarantees of continued employment. 
For example, Air Force Publications explicitly guaranteed 
continued employment to Majors serving at least fourteen years in 
service. The Air Force’s Commissioning Kit, which the Air Force 
provides to all Reserve Officer Training Corps Candidates, states, 
“Majors and above who are not selected for promotion are continued 
on active duty until eligible for retirement or up to 20 years for 
Majors . . . . However, in order to reduce overmanning, special boards 
can select some officers for early retirement.” 100  This language 
explicitly guarantees continued employment for Majors with at least 
fourteen years in service until they are eligible for retirement, except in 
cases of overmanning, which would result in the Officer receiving an 
early retirement. The stated policy does not suggest, or even 
contemplate, that the Air Force would simply terminate Officers, 
leaving them with no retirement or long term medical benefits. In fact, 
it states the opposite. Officers could not have predicted that the Air 
Force would cut short their careers without benefits because the Air 
Force had explicitly said otherwise. 
Further, the Officers in this instant case received e-mail 
communications from the Air Force’s Personnel Office advising them 
that “based on precedent” they would be continued on active duty 
because they had at least fourteen years in service.101 At first, the Air 
Force acted consistently with this precedent. The Air Force had 
already issued orders for these officers to move to their next duty 
assignments. 102  In some cases, the Air Force had already moved 
                                                            
99 See Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1073 (citing Yamashita v. England, No. 02-
5176, 2002 WL 31898182 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 23, 2002); Guerra v. Scruggs, 942 
F.2d 270 (4th Cir. 1991); Pauls v. Sec’y of the Air Force, 457 F.2d 294 (1st Cir. 
1972); Spadone v. McHugh, 842 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.D.C. 2012); Wilhelm v. 
Caldera, 90 F. Supp. 2d 3 (D.D.C. 2000), aff’d, 6 F. App’x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
100 See Flynn-Brown, supra note 3, at 1071 & n.31 (citing and discussing AIR 
FORCE ROTC CURRICULUM SECTION, TICKET: THE INITIAL COMMISSIONING KIT 
OF ESSENTIAL TRUTHS 42 (1996)). 
101 See id. at 1071 n.32 (“[T]he implicit understandings included promises by 
personnel command counselors that officers within six years of retirement 
would be continued on active duty.”). 
102 See id. 
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Officers’ household goods to new location assignments, when the Air 
Force unexpectedly and abruptly announced that the Airman would 
not be moving to another assignment but instead would be 
terminated.103 
In another instance, the Officer—a Pilot who had flown 269 
combat missions104—was on his way to Iraq when he learned that the 
Air Force was terminating his employment.105 Not only did the Air 
Force explicitly guarantee continued employment, it initially acted in 
accordance with that guarantee, to the detrimental reliance of military 
families. 
D. Policy Implications 
Why does it matter? After all, these officers had received pay and 
benefits for at least fourteen years while they served. It matters 
because of the Military’s all-or-nothing retirement system. Unless 
service members serve at least eighteen years, they receive neither a 
retirement pension nor benefits. Many of these families detrimentally 
relied on explicit and implicit promises made to them by the Air Force. 
The loss to these military families is significant. Furthermore, these 
terminations without pension and without medical benefits violated the 
law and may also have violated Constitutional provisions protecting 
property interests and guaranteeing due process of law. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is ironic that sometimes the Military is the primary contributor to 
problems faced by service members. This Article is based on two 
cases, which are currently being litigated. Both cases clearly 
demonstrate instances in which the Military opts for interpretations of 
its own rules and regulations to the detriment of service members, 
even when other interpretations are available that are more aligned 
with its own precedent. It is well known that suicide and 
unemployment are growing problems facing our Military personnel, 
but many people would be surprised to learn that the Military itself 
creates the very problems it complains about. One wonders whether 
                                                            
103 See id. 
104 Thompson, supra note 68. 
105 Id. (“Major Kale Mosley was getting ready to board his KC-135 refueling tanker 
for Iraq last June when a commander pulled him aside. He was being 
fired . . . .”). 
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the Band of Brothers (and Sisters) exists in today’s U.S. Military, or 
whether it is an ideal of the distant past. 
